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Abstract 
What broke out as the Arab Spring in Tunisia in 2010 stroke Egypt and shed its light on the 
Middle East, including Syria. During the first few days of demonstrations in Syria, the 
spring turned into a bloody fall and a full-scale civil war. Political-security crises and 
economic and social problems that had dominated the country during Assad's family rule 
left the state in deep defeat. Meanwhile, the arena of war turned into the scene of conflict 
between different political forces and their regional and international supporters, caused 
Syria to encounter immense foreign intervention. In this regard, this article attempts to 
figure out the answer to this question, "What are the causes for the Syrian state of failing 
during 2010-19?" The authors hypothesize that "the state in Syria has failed since the 
beginning of the protests due to persistent social, economic and political-security crises that 
led to the militarization of the country by the opposition and insurgent groups." The 
findings also indicate that the Syrian state faced historical crises after 2010 in economic 
imbalance and decline, demographic and environmental pressures, political-administrative 
corruption, and weak public services, which deepened after 2011, and it spread to other 
areas such as ethnic-religious violence. 
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1.Introduction 
The discussion of the failure of the state in Syria as the main issue of this 
paper stems from the developments that took place in the country after 
2011, as well as in the Middle East and North Africa region. The initial 
protests of the Syrian youth, which had erupted under the influence of 
developments in other countries in the region, led to an irreversible moment 
in the developments in this strategic Arab country due to the inability of the 
state to address and respond to these demands. The moment when the 
changes led to the destruction of infrastructure, killing of hundreds of 
thousands of people, poverty, displacement, and finally, the militarization of 
Syria after 2011 until today, and paved the way for foreign intervention in 
this country. These developments, as will be discussed later, are an example 
of the failure of the state in Syria. Although Bashar al-Assad, as the 
president of this country, which is gradually being accepted from a regional 
and international perspective, is trying to get out of the crisis of state failure, 
this does not diminish the depth of state failure in the recent years. 
It should be noted that in the crisis of state failure, Syria is not the only state 
to be referred to as fragility. Still, the Arab Part of the Middle East, is now a 
region that has accommodated many of these states. Therefore, the need to 
understand, identify, and investigate the causes of Syria falling into the trap 
of crisis, has become a necessity for the authors of the article. Now 
according to this introduction, the main question of the article is that “What 
are the causes for the Syrian state of failing during 2010-19?" in response to 
this question, it was hypothesized that “the state in Syria has failed since the 
beginning of the protests due to persistent social, economic and political-
security crises that led to the militarization of the country by the opposition 
and insurgent groups." 
2.Methodology 
In this paper, descriptive- analytic methodology, along with structural 
explanation, has been used to discover the relationship between the effective 
components in state failure and the whole. The resources are based on 
library-based research and statistical information analysis. 
3.Theoretical Framework 
The sovereign states in the International System are responsible for 
providing welfare and security for their citizens. Therefore, states that fail to 
provide these minimum standards are described as "weak," "fragile," or 
"with poor performance" (Torres and Anderson, 2004: 5). States with worse 
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conditions are labeled as "failed" or "collapsed" (Cramer and Goodhand, 
2002: 889). Although we are witnessing revolutions in the features of states 
today and it is not only the state that plays a role in the international system, 
failed states are usually unable to accomplish their primary responsibilities 
and functions. 
Zartman (1995) believes that failure happens when the basic functions of a 
state do not work. According to Rothberg (2002: 85), “Failed states are 
tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring 
factions. In most failed states, government troop’s battle armed revolts led 
by one or more rivals”. As Robert Jackson (1998: 2) by “failed states,” I 
shall be referring exclusively to states which cannot or will not safeguard 
minimal civil conditions, i.e., peace, order, security, etc. domestically.” The 
database prepared by the World Bank has classified 209 countries based on 
six dimensions, including voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule 
of law, and control of corruption (Kauffmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi, 2005: 
1). 
According to the Fund for Peace, such states may experience the following 
issues: 
 The loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force; 
 The erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; 
 An inability to provide reasonable public services; 
 The inability of the state to interact with other states (FFP,2015:3-4). 
In this study, "failure refers to a situation in which the state is not able to 
accomplish its political, security and economic functions on an internal level 
for its citizens, leading to the crisis inside this country. Failed situation soars 
as a result of approaching conflict and finally war, and different social and 
political groups will initiate a military confrontation with the government. If 
the failure situation of the state worsens, a part of the country will fall into 
the hands of paramilitary groups, and the state loses its control over these 
regions, which is something we witnessed in Syria during 2010-19.  
In the present study, a general framework was designed based on the 
different attitudes of failed state theories and the Fund for Peace approach. 
The structure of this framework is designed as follows: 
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As shown in this model, the state in Syria is under pressure based on social, 
economic and political-security indicators. Under this pressure, the Syrian 
State lost its power as a high official because it does not have an integrated 
shell. The Syria State not only was unable to provide the citizens with 
services in the mentioned sectors but also lost its control over parts of its 
territory and lost its position, legitimacy, and authority. Based on the 
proposed model, the Syrian state is faced with some challenges which are 
classified into three major groups: 
o Social indicators: Refugees and IDPs, Ethnic-religious violence, 
Demographic Pressures, and Environmental Issues 
o Economic indicators: Uneven Economic Development and Poverty & 
Economic Decline; 
o Political-security indicators: Corruption Rank; public Services, Security 
Apparatus and Shia, and Sunni militia forces (F.F.P.,2010-2019). 
As seen, the general headings of the above indicators are adopted from the 
model of fragile states in the Fund for Peace.   
 
4. Social indicators 
1-4. Refugees and IDPs  
Syria has had one of the most complex humanitarian crises in the world for 
nine years. The crisis on refugee and displaced issues is a complete tragedy 
for humanity in the 21st century. By 2016, over 4.8 million Syrians had to 
flee their country, and 6.5 million were displaced within the country 
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(UNOCHA, 2019). In 2018, Syria had the highest number of refugees who 
fled the country. That year, about 6.65 million refugees left the country. 
(Statista,2020) 
According to the reports by Mercy Corps, Syrian families are fighting for 
survival. Some endanger their lives on the way to Europe. Many Syrian 
asylum seekers are living in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq. The 
number of these asylum seekers is increasing every year (Mercy Corps, 
2015). According to 2018 statistics, about 5.6 million people have fled the 
country, and another 6.3 million people have been displaced inside the 
country (World vision,2018). Given the 20 million population of Syria, this 
number of asylum seekers and displaced people indicate the depth of the 
crisis in this country. The chart below shows the situation of Syria refugees 
and IDPs from 2010 to 2019. A score of 0 means the stability of the state, 
and a score of 10 means the state is entirely failed. 
 







(Source: Fund for Peace, 2010-2019) 
 
The situation in Syria among the countries affected by the refugee crisis is a 
humanitarian catastrophe and is likely to remain one of the most important 
domestic, regional, and international issues for the next decade. Lack of 
internal security, weak social and health infrastructure, lack of hope for the 
future, and the collapse of economic infrastructure are the most important  
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reasons that make these people afraid to return to their country. On the other 
hand, they have become a lever of political-security pressure against Europe 
and the Syrian government from Turkey, which is home to more than 3 
million Syrian refugees, which complicates their situation. 
 
2-4. Ethnic-religious violence 
Due to the war and mass migration in this country, accurate statistics on 
population and ethnic and religious ratios are not available, but before the 
crisis, the population was about 22 million people, which in terms of 
ethnicity is about 87 to 90 percent Arabs, about 7 to 10 percent were Kurds 
and about 3 percent were Turks and Armenians. Religiously, about 74 
percent of the country's population is Sunni, about 13 percent Alawite and 
Shiite, about 10 percent Christian, and about 3 percent Druze and other 
religions. (Bayat, et al, Spring,2020,52) In Syria, ethnic and religious 
divisions are much more active and serious than the divisions arising from 
the confrontation between tyranny and freedom. (Mirzaei.jegarloei, Kazemi 
and Motaghi, Winter,2017:83) 
As a result, Syria is a country engaged in ethnic and religious violence, 
which has been witnessing an intensification of ethnic and religious 
conflicts since 2011, with the onset of the internal crisis and, in particular, 
with the rise of ISIL in 2013. So another layer in the critical situation of 
Syria in the social domain is that the country has drowned in a deep ethnic-
religious violence crisis. Due to the ethnic diversity and historical gap 
between ethnic-religious sects of the region, the demonstrations became 
violent and turned into a civil war division of the country among ethnic and 
religious groups, i.e., Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, Alavids, and Christians. 
Intensification of the violence has caused Syria to face a civil war, and the 
military groups of different ethnicities and tribes got armed and pushed the 
government away from their cities and towns. 
As a result, Syria became the battlefield of the war of all against all. In June 
2013, the United Nations declared that 90 thousand were killed in these 
conflicts. It is estimated that there have been almost 207,000 civilian 
casualties since the beginning of the conflict in 2011 (Statista,2020). In 
March 2018, the Syrian Human Rights Watch stated that about 511 
thousand people had been killed since the beginning of the war in Syria 7 
years ago. This violent war has turned into a slaughterhouse for civilians, 
the military, and the paramilitary. More than 6,800 per month were reported 
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from March 2011 to March 2018, which means roughly 200 people were 
killed per day in Syria during this period (Reuters,2018). 
Although violence has become an internal situation in Syria's political, 
cultural and social structures during a decade of civil war, it is a major threat 
posed by Islamist aggression forces affiliated with countries such as Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This threat has exacerbated the ethnic-religious 
crisis in Syria and has led to the failure of the state in Syria. These countries 
are pursuing their own interests and disrupting the internal unity of these 
groups in the pluralistic religious atmosphere of Syria, and they have been 
able to play a major role in the failure of the state in this country in the years 
under review. 
3-4. Demographic pressures and environmental issues 
Another key social factor is demographic pressures and environmental 
issues. The two have a direct impact on each other at the same time and 
have become a crisis considering climate change in recent decades. Today, 
due to population explosion, resource depletion, gap between rich and poor, 
increasing human needs and advances in science and technology, the 
environment is more endangered than before (Ahmadi and Akbarzadeh, 
Autumn,2018: 97). This crisis is one of the drivers of the failure of the state 
in Syria. The fund for peace states:" Pressures on the population such as 
disease and natural disasters make it difficult for the government to protect 
its citizens or demonstrate a lack of capacity or will. Includes pressures and 
measures related to Natural Disasters, Disease, Environmental crisis, 
Pollution, Food Scarcity, Malnutrition, Water Scarcity, Population Growth, 
and Mortality" (FFP, 2013: 10) These varied criteria on population pressures 
will be presented at the end of the section, based on Syria's annual scores on 
the fund for Peace data (bar chart). 
Studies on population pressures and environmental issues in Syria show that 
the lack of natural water and the decrease in precipitation, Syria was 
experienced severe droughts beginning in the mid-2000s. In the last years, 
increasing population has added to the growing demand for water and other 
natural resources in Syria. Increased land use is needed to support this 
growing population, which contributes to erosion and makes much of the 
land unusable (Haktanir and et al,2004:2-4). "Severe multiyear drought 
contributed to the displacement of large populations from rural to urban 
centers, food insecurity for more than a million people, and increased  
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unemployment—with subsequent effects on political stability" (Gleick, 
2014:334) and that this, in turn, precipitated large-scale migration from the 
Syrian countryside. As about ' 1.5 million people were internally displaced 
by the drought' (Kelley and et al, 2015:3241–2).  
Commenting on the role of desertification and drought in the Syrian crisis, 
Gianluca Serra states: “Back in 2009, I dared to forecast that if the rampant 
desertification process gripping the Syrian steppe was not halted soon, it 
could eventually become a trigger for social turmoil and even for a civil 
war. In an article on The Ecologist, Alex Kirby writes that the severe 2006-
2010 drought in Syria may have contributed to the civil war. The ecological 
crisis created an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the rural areas of the 
country, followed by massive internal displacements that the government 
failed to tackle and manage. For the first time, Syria had to rely on massive 
international emergency food aid in 2008" (Serra,2015).  
Migrants from the drought were a contributory factor in the country's 2011 
unrest. It intensified social uprising, exacerbating the pre-existing political 
instability, and the fragile situation of the Syrian State has further 
compounded this environmental crisis. Now, based on the annual condition 
of Syrian population pressures at the Peace Foundation from 2010 to 2019, 
we have plotted the following bar chart: 
 
Graph 2: Demographic pressure from 2010-2019 
 
(Source: Fund for Peace, 2010-2019) 
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5. Economic indicators 
1-5. Uneven economic development 
Regarding this indicator, the Fund for Peace points out that uneven 
economic growth in a country means inequality in economic development in 
different parts, groups, factions, and regions in a country. It means that the 
tendency of the state toward a faction or ethnic and religious sect or a 
particular group or party causes them to enjoy economic development, while 
the rest will be kept deprived. The constituents of this indicator include the 
Gini index, the highest 10% revenue share, the lowest 10% revenue share, 
dispersion of rural services compared to urban ones, access to advanced 
services, and the rate of slum population (FFP,2015:17). 
Scoring each parameter in the fragile states index is based on a 0-10 scale; 
the closer the index to 0, the more even the economic development, and it 
shows a dynamic economy. The closer the index to 10, the more uneven its 
economic development will be, and there will be a severe income difference 
between upper and lower deciles and severe discrimination between urban 
and rural services and access to advanced services in different regions. For 
this indicator, we tried to utilize the Syria fragile states index data proposed 
by the Fund for Peace from 2010 to 2019 (FFP,2010-2019). 
 
Graph 3: Uneven economic development from 2010-2019 
 
(Source: Fund for Peace, 2010-2019) 
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According to this bar chart, Syria's score is close to 10, which means it is in 
a fragile situation and is one of the highly fragile countries in the Middle 
East. It should be noticed that due to the civil war in Syria, the economy of 
this country has collapsed, and the regions involved with war have the worst 
economic situation. Syria's unbalanced economic development is by no 
means the product of the post-2011 civil war crisis but is rooted in rent-
seeking in the country, which has benefited groups affiliated with the 
country's political system and left others helpless. The crisis intensified after 
2011 and became one of the causes of the protests. As a result, civil war 
erupted and turned Syria into a completely failed economic state in the last 
decade. 
 
2-5. Poverty & economic decline 
Severe poverty and economic decline mean the states' inability to fulfill the 
needs of those civilians who are unable to meet their needs. The economic 
downturn of a state can be reflected in indicators such as economic scarcity, 
government debt, unemployment, people's purchasing power, G.D.P. 
growth, and inflation (F.F.P.,2015:17). As stated earlier, scoring each 
parameter is bases on a 0-10 scale. A score closes to 10 shows severe 
unemployment, low purchasing power, economic scarcity, government debt, 
low per capita income, and decreased GDP (FFP,2010-2019). The situation 
of Syria's economy, according to the index of poverty and economic decline 
from 2010 to 2019, is as follows. 
 
Graph 4: Poverty & Economic Decline from 2010-2019 
 
(Source: Fund for Peace, 2010-2019) 
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As shown in the bar chart, Syria's economic situation has worsened year 
after year. Syria's poverty and economic decline scores have been 7.8 in 
2016, 8.1 in 2017, 8.5 in 2018, and 8.8 in 2019 (FFP, 2010-2019). Due to 
the crisis, Syria's economy declined by 70%. Severe international sanctions 
alongside with destruction of the infrastructures during the war have been 
the major causes of such decay. The unemployment rate in Syria in 2017 
was 50%, and 82.5% of people live below the poverty line (CIA,2020). 
Despite the constant attempts of Assad's government to re-control the 
country, this indicator shows the failure of the state during these years. 
Overall, rising public poverty, inflation, unemployment following the civil 
war, the collapse of the national currency, the destruction of parts of the 
economic infrastructure, and the government's lack of control over the 
country's oil resources are among the most important consequences of state 
failure in Syria and expansion economic decline in this country. 
 
6. Political-Security Indicators 
1-6. Corruption Rank  
Corruption happens at different levels, and there is usually a difference 
between the “macro” level or political corruption on the one hand and the 
“micro” level or administrative corruption on the other hand. The first one 
influences the high levels of the government and the leaders leading to 
erosion of good governing, rule of law, and economic stability, while the 
second one is related to paying bribes in exchange for better services, 
benefits, or hiring friends in reliable jobs. Although the negative effects of 
the first one are on the distribution of resources and high-level political 
decisions that are regularly discussed in the media, this is the administrative 
corruption that is conducted by the government’s employees at all levels 
(UNODC,2013:12). 
One of the best ways to understand the corruption status in Syria is to refer 
to the Corruption Perception Index carried out by Transparency 
International (TI,2003-2019) every year. This index ranks the corruption 
status of the countries based on corruption in the public sector based on this 
definition, “Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” In 
other words, this index is an indicator that shows the public sector 
corruption rank of a country among other countries. According to this index, 
a score closes to zero indicates severe corruption, and a country with a score  
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of 100 is highly clean and transparent (TI, 2003-2019). To understand the 
corruption status in Syria, we referred to the annual rankings by 
Transparency International. 
 
Graph 5: Transparency international rank of Syria from 2010 to 2019 
 
(Source: Trading economics, 2010-2019) 
 
According to the 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index, Syria is the 178 least 
corrupt nation out of 180 countries. The corruption in this country worsens 
with an increasing trend during the years of civil war, and the worst status 
was calculated in the last year (TI,2010-2019). Based on this indicator, civil 
war, division of the country, and external interventions have worsened 
Syria’s place in this index. The Syrian government also faced political-
administrative and financial corruption before the war, which was the result 
of central government rents to certain groups and individuals. The crisis, as 
shown in the table, escalated sharply after 2012 and culminated in 2016, 
making Syria one of the most corrupt countries in the world, which has been 
instrumental in defeating the state. 
 
2-6. Public services 
As a result of the state's failure and intensification of the civil war in Syria, 
the people of this country have had severe problems with having access to 
education and health services, and the infrastructures in all sectors of public 
services have faced severe damages. According to the statistics published by 
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the United Nations Office from 2011 to 2016, we have witnessed that about 
11.5 million Syrians needed health care, 13.5 million required humanitarian 
support, 12.1 million needed water, 5.7 million children require educational 
assistance. Also, about 2.7 million had no access to schools and education. 
About 2.5 million people were in food insecurity, and 1.5 million needed 
shelters and life facilities (UNOCHA,2019). At least 50% of sewage 
systems are affected by hostilities and are not functional, exposing 
communities to significant health risks. 6.5 million people are food insecure, 
and 2.5 million people are at risk of food insecurity (UNOCHA,2019). 
According to the statistics published by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA,2018), at the beginning of the civil war in Syria, 1.6 million Syrians 
did not have access to electricity. Due to the war and complete destruction 
of most conflict regions, this country lost a large part of its electrical 
infrastructures. Besides, by May 2016, the forces close to Bashar al-Assad 
targeted 310 hospitals and health facilities 454 times (Allen-Ebrahimian, 
2017). In comprehensive research of the destructions of the public and 
service sector in three towns Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama in March 2017, the 
World Bank writes these three towns have been destroyed from 50% to 
80%. Also, the destruction rate of education infrastructures has been more 
than 53%, which has caused 74% of the students to be deprived of 
education. These statistics are only a part of the crisis in the public, health, 
education, and life situation of the Syrians since the beginning of the crisis. 
The following bar chart depicts the weak status of public services in Syria 
because of war from 2010 to 2019 based on the Fund for Peace reports. 
 
Graph 6: Public service from 2010 to 2019 
 
(Source: Fund for Peace, 2010-2019) 
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Based on the chart above, the state of public services and the destruction of 
its infrastructure during the years under study, which has continued the 
crisis and civil war in the country, reached from 5.8 in 2011 to 9.3 in 2018. 
Under these circumstances, the state of Syria's public service is approaching 
the red dot and the crisis a year. The country's score in 2012 and 2013 was 
7, in 2014 was 7/2, 8/2 in 2015, 8/9in 2016, and 9/2 in 2017. The state of 
public services plays a key role in the fate of the Syrian state. Public 
services are closely linked to all previous factors. As long as public services 
are weak, the displacement and asylum-seekers crisis not only continue, but 
there is no solution. Poor public services will mean more ethnic-religious 
divisions over how to divide them and will lead to unbalanced economic 
development. The result of poor public services is an economic decline and 
state failure. This is quite evident from 2010 to 2019. 
 
3-6. Security Apparatus 
Historically, the Syrian army is one of the most important components of 
this country and has a historical background in the developments in this 
country. In fact, this army has its roots in local and tribal forces which 
merged into the country’s official army after the end of the French 
guardianship and the independence of Syria (Pollack,2004). It plays a vital 
role in the Syrian government, resulted in five military coups in 1949, 1954, 
1963, 1966, and 1970 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010: 
273). By 2010, the army had about 250,000 personnel in different sections 
(Dagher,2018). It is the main source to keep Bashar al-Assad’s authority and 
the main pillar of stability inside the country although it has conducted 
repressive measures against the civilians. 
With the onset of the crisis in Syria and the spread of anti-government 
protests in 2011, we witnessed a breakup in some parts of the country's 
official army. Since 2012, the Syrian military has played a significant role in 
supporting the Assad government and preventing the empowerment of the 
opposition, suppressing the protesters, rebel groups, and the free army. 
During that year, about 10 thousand personnel of the army quit their posts 
and formed the Free Syrian Army to fight the Assad government. Also, the 
free army had an estimated number of 200 thousand personnel. In 2012, due 
to the unwillingness of some militias to oppose and suppress the protesters, 
they quit their posts and were estimated to be 60 thousand people (Emre and 
Abu-Nasr,2012). On June 14, 2013, 73 officers of the Syrian army sought 
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asylum in Turkey, among whom there were seven generals and 20 colonels 
(Daily Star,2013). Later, these officers formed the central command pillar of 
the Free Syrian Army. 
Before being supported by Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, the Syrian army 
underwent serious defeat, and before 2016, a large part of Syria was taken 
out of the control of the government and army and was controlled by the 
free army, al-Nusra, ISIS, and most importantly the Kurds and other militant 
groups. After the army was strengthened and most regions were reclaimed 
by al-Assad and his advocates, he tried to show the lost power and authority 
of the army. In December 2016, with the fall of Aleppo and its control by 
Assad, the army took control of 5 other populous cities. The army air forces 
were not reluctant to use chemical weapons and to target residential areas, 
civilians, and hospitals in cities and regions controlled by insurgents and the 
opposition (Laub,2017).  
The most outstanding chemical attacks are the one in Khan Shaykhun on 
April 4, 2017, and one in Douma on April 7, 2018 (Hubbard, 2018). The 
inefficiency of the military in Syria and the spread of war against all, the 
violence against the civilians demonstrate the profound weakness of the 
state. The Syrian army has gradually been able to regain control of the 
country; however, it was possible because of foreign assistance and not the 
independent power of the army. The position of fragility in Syria in this 
index is as follows. 
Graph 7: Security apparatus from 2010 to 2019 
 
(Source: Fund for Peace, 2010-2019) 
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4-6. Shia and Sunni militia forces 
The onset of the Syrian crisis and its escalation, along with the weakness of 
Assad's army, paved the way for various political and military movements 
in Syria (Davtalab, Kazemi Zand and Zakerian, Spring 2020:226). Most of 
the Shia-led forces are formed in the crisis in Syria. After 2013 when ISIS, 
rebel groups, and Sunni opposition spread in Syria and becoming a threat to 
Shias, Shia militia groups also became incited to take part in the Syrian 
battle. Since that year, we have witnessed an increase in Shia foreign 
fighters in Syria to defend Assad's state and prevent the fall of Syria. 
Lebanese Hezbollah militias are among the most famous and probably the 
most important of these groups, but they are not the only force. Iraqi Shia 
militias also sent their fighters to Syria and sent some troops to Syria like 
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and other military groups (Lund,2015). Since the 
beginning of 2016, many Hezbollah forces in Syria that are estimated to be 
4 to 8 thousand, with the help of the Russian Air Force, have played a key 
role in pushing and clearing Syrian lands from opposition forces. Hezbollah 
has often been at war with Sunni forces opposed to Assad (Laub,2017). 
Two other Shia forces operating in Syria are Liwa Fatemiyoun and Liwa 
Zainabiun that have mobilized in support of Assad's state. Liwa Fatemiyoun 
consists of Afghani Shias who support Assad and are estimated by various 
sources to be between 10 and 20 thousand. Liwa Zainabiun is Pakistani 
Shias that support Assad (Heistein and West,2015). These forces are known 
as forces loyal to Assad and the Holy Shrine Defenders. They defend Assad 
and protect Shia religious sites in Syria against his opposition forces. These 
Ummah-centered forces have originated from state failure, and they will be 
the main source of state failure in the future due to their motivations and 
goals. 
Another active military force that played a significant role in the fragility of 
the Syrian government was ISIS. It is a Sunni Multinational Islamic 
extremist terrorist group that roses from al-Qaeda's ashes in Iraq and 
renamed it the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in 2013. ISIS, as the 
bloodiest outcome of the jihadist Salafist movement, was the real result of 
the failure of the state, the closure of political solution horizons, and 
deepening crises in Syria and Iraq (Abu-Bakr Ali,2015:7-8). Since 2014, 
ISIS has been considered as the key to state failure in Syria. It is led by and 
mainly composed of Sunni Arabs from Iraq and Syria. As of March 2015, it 
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has control over territory occupied by 10 million people in Iraq and Syria 
(Mossallanejad,2016:3). 
It sought to replace state-centered world order with a global Islamic state 
based in Iraq and Syria, expand its branches and networks in other countries 
(CIA,2020), and finally use the Islamic laws as the basis of legislation for its 
caliphate. The rapid empowerment of this force in Syria and Iraq, which 
were both failed states, quickly gained international attention, and the 
United States launched airstrikes on ISIS in Iraq and then Syria in the form 
of an international coalition. ISIS spread its attacks and moved toward the 
Kurdish city Kobani and besieged it for four months. As a result of U.S. 
airstrikes and the struggles of the Kurdish forces in Kobani, ISIS suffered its 
first defeat and retreated from the city. It was the first time that ISIS forces 
had retreated. In May 2014, ISIS conquered the historic city of Palmyra and 
began to destroy parts of this cultural area (Glenn,2016). Within months of 
bloody and suicidal battles, the Islamic State had seized vast areas of 
western Syria and eastern Iraq with a population of more than 10 million 
people in 2014. 
In early 2017, the U.S. officials warned that ISIS might have 10,000 loyal 
troops in Iraq and Syria. During the same year, Kurdish forces, along with 
the United States, launched new operations against ISIS (Glenn, 2016). In 
2018, ISIS lost its control over much of the regions in Syria and only had 
control over limited Syrian-Iraqi borders and southern Syrian regions (CIA, 
2020). With its gradual defeat, it became a force without any lands under the 
rule; however, it still had the necessary power in the form of secret and 
suicide layers. With the current tense situation in northern Syria under attack 
by Turkey and with the United States withdrawing from the region, ISIS is 
likely to revive.  
 
7. Research Findings 
The findings of the study indicate that the state in Syria has failed in all 
social, economic, and political-security dimensions during the period under 
study. At the societal level, the country of 20 million people has faced a 
crisis of displacement and asylum of 12 million people, which means that 
more than 60% of the country's population has been displaced during these 
years. A large part of this displaced population is also made up of ethnic-
religious groups that the Assad government has been unable to protect and 
secure. These groups are also the main subject of war-related violence, with  
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most reported deaths, displaced persons, victims of sexual violence, as well 
as poverty and malnutrition. At the same time, in completing the triangle of 
social crises, the crisis of demographic and environmental pressures has 
itself become an unfortunate situation that has a lifespan of more than three 
decades. The drought crisis caused by declining annual rainfall, coupled 
with Turkish pressure to block the Euphrates River and build massive dams, 
has hurt Syria, and the growth of a population that needs more water for 
agriculture and drinking has added to the complexity. Such social crises are 
likely to become a serious problem for the state and society in the coming 
decades, and severe climate change will add to the burden. 
On the other hand, the economic situation in Syria, which was facing 
problems before 2011, with the onset of the crisis in the country and the 
spread of civil war, gradually slipped into a deep crisis and with the 
expansion of development gaps in different parts of the country suffered a 
gradual but deep economic decline. These conditions have forced the 
country to ration basic goods such as bread. The findings of the article show 
that more than 10 million Syrians are experiencing food insecurity. The 
crippling sanctions have also plunged the economy into a deep recession 
that cannot be overcome without foreign aid, as the country suffered $ 300 
billion in damage to all sectors of the economy, security, and society from 
2011 to 2020.   
The findings of the article show that the political-security impact of the 
conflict is also very significant and is constantly increasing. Lack of 
continued access to health, education, housing, and employment services 
has exacerbated the effects of the conflict, leading millions to 
unemployment and poverty. With a severely broken health care system, the 
Syrians are now facing the deepest health crisis of a century, the outbreak of 
Covid-19, which is still spreading, and there are no facilities to deal with the 
virus. The crisis looks daunting in the context of the collapse of the 
country's health infrastructure, as there is no proper system for testing 
citizens. 
At the same time, Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni Arab militias alongside the 
government have inflicted another part of the political-security defeat in 
Syria. Although parts of these forces are in alliance with the government 
(Shiites) or an unwritten agreement with it (the Kurds), the Syrian army is 
no longer the only carrier and armed force in the country to seize power. 
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Rather, the Sunni insurgents in Idlib and Afrin and the allied actions of the 
United States in the areas of Kobani, Hasakah, Qamishlo, Jazira, etc. have 
military-security power. They are the main cause of the state's failure in the 
political-security dimension because they have seriously challenged the 
state's control over a large area of Syrian territory. 
8. Conclusion 
Overall, this paper sought to develop a model that would fit the situation in 
Syria between 2010 and 2019 and be able to analyze the failed state of 
Syria. We attempt to examine the critical internal situation of Syria within 
the framework of three major indicators of social, economic, and political-
security leading to the failure of the state. According to the three indicators, 
the state in Syria has been unable to meet the accumulated demands of the 
people. Thus, there was a situation that led to domestic protests, the spread 
of corruption, the lack of public services, the lack of political freedoms, the 
lack of government accountability, unemployment, and economic decline. 
The suppression of civil protests by the military and disciplinary forces led 
Syria into a crisis that led to a war against everyone. In this context, 
religious groups, especially jihadist currents, found the space appropriate to 
grow and paved the way for the promotion of religious violence in the 
country. This situation saw the rise of Salafi and radical jihadist groups such 
as ISIL, al-Qaeda and al-Nusra, and dozens of other currents that had a 
crucial role in deepening the Syrian crisis. These groups have been the most 
important cause of the escalation of violence and war, adding to the 
continuing failure of the state in Syria. Consequently, the authors believe 
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